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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

30 October 1972



MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Note on Places Where Inspection Teams  
Need to be Positioned

1. During our conversation on Saturday, 28 October, you asked me to take a look at where within South Vietnam ICCS inspection teams ought to be positioned if they were to have a reasonable chance of monitoring North Vietnamese compliance with those portions of the overall agreement in which the DRV pledged not to use Laotian or Cambodian territory as a base for attacking South Vietnam and further pledged that troop reinforcement of Communist forces in South Vietnam (i. e., infiltration) would cease and materiel resupply would be limited to the "one-for-one" equipment replacement type of exchange which is all the emerging agreement permits.

2. To meet your request, on returning to my office after our conversation I convoked a very small group of our best and most discreet logisticians, posing the substance of your question but keying it to an allegedly hypothetical post-hostilities situation. My associates were unanimous, adamant and emphatic in their insistence that teams positioned solely within South Vietnam would stand virtually no chance of being able to monitor North Vietnamese compliance with the "hypothetical" agreements outlined. I then rephrased my question, asking for a quick study of where they felt inspection teams would have to be positioned to stand any kind of chance of detecting major inputs of manpower or supplies to Communist forces in South Vietnam.

3. Attached for your private information is the fruit of my colleagues' weekend labors. (You are the only recipient of the only external copy of this study.) Please realize that the inspection program outlined in the attached study is not a "maximum" one. It is the minimum program which in our best professional judgment could be expected to spot most major movements of supplies and personnel destined for Communist forces in South Vietnam -- i.e., to detect major, flagrant and systematic North Vietnamese violation of those aspects of the proposed agreement which bar personnel reinforcement or the dispatch of supplies other than overt, supervised replacement exchange.

4. A final cautionary note, the team structure and total inspection program outlined in the attached memorandum would almost certainly not detect all unauthorized movement of men or supplies if Hanoi was determined to cheat but did so in as covert a fashion as possible.



George A. Carver, Jr.  
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

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
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